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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Civil Procedure-Use and Constitutionality of the Federal
Interpleader Act
After the passage of the Federal Interpleader Act,1 uncertainty
developed as to the extent to which the Act should be available to
insurance companies defending assureds against two or more in-
jured parties.2 The question also arose whether its authorization
of federal jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity is consti-
tutionally permissible. In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. TashireO
the United States Supreme Court addressed itself to both prob-
lems in defining the proper use of the Act and holding it constitu-
tional.
Tashire arose out of a collision between a truck and a bus in
Northern California in which many passengers were injured. Four
passengers from California brought suit in a California state court
against the bus line and bus driver, both citizens of California,
and the truck driver, a citizen of Oregon. It was anticipated that
other passengers from California and elsewhere would also sue.
Before other suits were brought or judgment was reached in any
pending suit, State Farm, representing only the truck driver on
a liability insurance policy for 20,000 dollars,4 interpleaded in the
'The first Federal Interpleader Act was passed in 1917 and successive
amendments expanded its usefulness. For legislative history see 3 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.06 (2d ed. 1967). Relevant portions of the Act
read as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
of interpleader . . . filed by any person, firm, or corporation . . .
having in his custody or possession money or property of the value of
$500 or more, or having issued a . . . policy of insurance . . . of
value or amount of $500 or more . .. if
(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship . . .
are claiming or may claim to be entitled to such money or property,
or to any one or more benefits arising by virtue of any . . . policy
... ; and if
(2) the plaintiff has . . . paid . . . the amount due under such
obligation into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment
of the court ....
28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1965).
'See, e.g., 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 551 (1961, Supp. 1967).
386 U.S. 523 (1967).
"The policy was a standard automobile liability insurance contract in
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United States District Court for the District of Oregon. State
Farm asked that all persons who were suing or might sue the as-
sured, i.e., persons with potential claims to the proceeds of as-
sured's insurance policy, be enjoined from any action in any other
court against both the assured and insurer, and that such actions
be confined to that district court. When the injunction was granted,
it appeared that State Farm, which could not be made a party to
any state court suit until a judgment against the assured might be
had, would be able to force all persons suing the assured into a
federal district court of its own choosing both for trial on liability
and for apportionment of the insurance policy proceeds.5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the statutory
language, "claimants . . . [who] are claiming or may claim," to
mean only persons with judgments against the assured who would
then be entitled under the insurance contract to sue the insurer
and held that interpleader did not lie against potential claimants to
the insurance fund.' On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held
that the words "may claim" do permit the insurer to interplead po-
tential claimants to the insurance proceeds.7 But it was further held
that the scope of interpleader should be limited to proration of the
which State Farm promised to defend the assured in any action against
him arising out of an automobile accident. State Farm was required under
the contract to pay only if the assured were found liable for the accident or
upon settlement. Under California law and the contract an injured party
could not maintain a direct action against the insurance company until
a final judgment against the assured was reached. 386 U.S. at 539.
'Interpleader is a procedural device, arising out of equity, in which
a stakeholder asks the court to determine the rights of parties with con-
flicting claims that equal or exceed the amount of a fund in the stakeholder's
possession. The classic example of an interpleader is one who has found
a treasure trove to which he has no right and whom is being sued or
threatened by several parties claiming the money. The interpleader pays the
money into court and asks the court to bring in the parties and adjudicate
their rights. Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957). The Federal
Interpleader Act was passed primarily to make this device available in the
situation where there are claimants in several states and no state process
would be sufficient to bring all the parties into a single forum. See generally
Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134(1932); Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45 YALE L.J.
1161-67 (1936) ; Chafee, Federal Iinterpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE
L.J. 377, 414-17 (1940).
' Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 363 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966).
The theory of the Ninth Circuit was that since the injured parties had
no direct action against the insurance company until after judgment, they
could not be "claimants" against the insurance company.
7 386 U.S. at 533.
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insurance proceeds.8 Under this construction, the Act amounts to
a device for impounding insurance funds for eventual proration
among parties successful in securing judgments on liability in what-
ever courts they chose to bring their actions.
In addition, the Supreme Court raised, on its own motion,9
the question of the use of minimal diversity'0 in the Act and held
that it is consistent with the grant of federal jurisdiction in article
III of the Constitution "to controversies . . . between citizens of
different states . . . "" This question was left in the wake of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,2 the famous case that laid down the rule of
complete diversity. In Strawbridge a plaintiff from Massachusetts
was not permitted to join a defendant from Massachusetts with a
defendant from Vermont. In holding that jurisdiction would not
lie unless every party to the suit could sue in diversity every party
aligned against him, the Court seemed to construe only the general
diversity statute. Nevertheless, the similarity of the statutory
language "or the suit is between the citizen of a state where the
suit is brought, and a citizen of another state . . . ,,s to the word-
8 Id. at 537.
' Even if an issue of the court's jurisdiction is not argued, the Supreme
Court may still raise it. This procedure was followed in Treinies v. Sun-
shine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) where the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Interpleader Act of 1936 and held that if claimants
were from different states and the interpleader was from the same state
as one of the claimants, there was still complete diversity because the inter-
pleader was not a real party in interest.
10 The Act grants jurisdiction where there is minimal diversity between
claimants regardless of the citizenship of the interpleader. Where all the
claimants to a fund are from state A and the stakeholder is in state B, the
Act is not available for lack of diversity among the claimants, but the
stakeholder in state B can interplead through FED. R. Civ. P. 22 because
there is complete diversity between the claimants and the stakeholder. If
claimants are citizens of states A and B and the stakeholder is a citizen
of state C, there is complete diversity and there are claimants of diverse
citizenship, but only under the Act can the stakeholder get service of
process on all claimants. Under rule interpleader, service of process is
limited to the state where the action is brought. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (1965) gives, on the other hand, nationwide service of
process when the Act is used. Where claimants are citizens of states A
and B and the stakeholder is a citizen of State A, there is incomplete or
minimal diversity, and only the Act is available. This unusual use of
minimal diversity to support federal jurisdiction is dramatically illustrated
in Haynes v. Felder 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957), where a stakeholder
from Texas was allowed to interplead one claimant from Texas along
with a rival group of persons with a joint claim, of whom three were from
Texas and one was from Tennessee.
"U.S. CONsT. art III, § 2.17 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
1 Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 78.
1967]
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ing of Article III gave rise to the question whether the Constitution
likewise requires complete diversity.14 Later cases limited the force
of Strawbridge,15 and critics argued that the rule of complete di-
versity should be applied solely to the general diversity statute."0
In so holding in Tashire the Supreme Court settles the issue and
leaves Congress free to expand or contract the use of diversity as
long as there is at least minimal diversity.
The construction of the Federal Interpleader Act in Tashire
presents an ironic situation. The holding allowing expansion of
interpleader to potential as well as judgment claimants for pro-
ration is at least a technical victory for insurers. But it is actually
of much greater benefit to claimants because there is no other device
available at present by which claimants can procure proration of
insurance funds.' 7 The holding limiting the use of interpleader
solely to proration denies insurers, however, a great advantage
sought from the statute, i.e., to use the statute as a joinder device
to bring trials on liability into a single court."8 It will remain to be
" In Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130, 145 (1855) the Su-
preme Court indicated that complete diversity might be required by the
Constitution.
"E.g., Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48
(1922): Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921);
Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554-56 (1844).
3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE § 22.09 [1] (2d ed. 1967); Chafee,
Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 393-98 (1940).
" The "first-in-time, first-in-right" rule, followed in most states that
have decided the question, gives an insurance fund to the first of several
claimants to get judgment against the assured. Thus one of several injured
parties may not petition the court to have the insurance fund impounded for
distribution or require the insurers to settle with all claimants. Alford v.
Textile Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 224, 103 S.E.2d 8 (1958); Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d
416 (1960). In Comment, Pro-Rating Automobile Liability Insurance to
Midtiple Claimants, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1965) four significant reasons
from the opinions for denying proration to plaintiffs are listed:
1. The injured party has no standing to sue an insurer.
2. Prqration would result in undue delay for the parties.
3. The insurer should not be burdened with duty to judge the settle-
ment value of all possible claims.
4. If an insurer is not free to settle as it will, it might result in
higher judgments for which the insurer might later be liable to
the assured for failure to settle in good faith.
For suggested solutions to the problems in this complex area see Keeton,
Preferential Settlement of Liability-Insurance Claims, 70 HARv. L. REV. 27
(1956).
"8In Tashire the District Court not only required that trials on liability
against State Farm be tried in Oregon, but later broadened the injunction
to require that all suits against the bus line and bus driver, citizens of
California, also be tried in Oregon. For a dramatic report on the reaction
this kind of tactical move can have on plaintiffs, see Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Greyhound Lines Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. La. 1966).
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seen whether the advantages to insurers of the right to interplead
potential claimants will be sufficient to motivate insurers so to use
the Act and thereby make the device of proration available to all
claimants.
It has always been held that once two or more injured parties
obtained judgments against an assured in excess of policy limits,
the insurer could interplead them to prorate the fund.'9 This pro-
cedure has several advantages to the insurer. It relieves him of
the need to go into several courts to defend against several judg-
ment creditors racing for execution. It also eliminates the possi-
bility of liability in excess of the policy limits because the insurer
is absolved of responsibility for distribution of the fund." Finally,
other claimants to the fund are cut off.2 ' Although the first-in-time
rule would usually protect the insurer after the fund is exhausted,
it has been suggested by at least one court that if an insurer ex-
hausted funds in a state that applies the first-in-time rule, it might
still be held liable for failure to apportion funds equitably between
the injured parties in a state that does not recognize that rule.22
Although two early cases, decided before the words "may claim"
were written into the Interpleader Act in 1948, limited the use of
interpleader to injunctions against parties that had obtained judg-
ments on liability in other courts,2 3 later decisions permitted the in-
surer to interplead all claimants whether or not any judgment had
been reached.24 In upholding this construction of the 1948 Act, the
Supreme Court in Tashire noted that it would, by negating the first-
" E.g., Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474, 482
(E.D. La. 1960) See also, Kiaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934 (8th
Cir. 1934) (implying this possibility under 1926 Act).2 Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La.
1960).21Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1957).2 3Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966).
Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934 (8th Cir 1934); American
Indem. Co. v. Hale, 71 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
"Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966);
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Marceaux, 263 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. La. 1966);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.
La. 1966); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.
Ind. 1964); Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere, 188 F. Supp. 474(E.D. La. 1960). But cf. Burchfield v. Bevans, 242 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.
1957) (applying state law); National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North
America, 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (rule interpleader). For
state cases allowing interpleader see Century Indem. Co. v. Kofsky, 115
Conn. 193, 161 A. 101 (1932); Underwriters for Lloyds v. Jones, 261
S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1953); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. LePage, 105 N.H. 327, 200
A.2d 12 (1964).
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in-time rule, eliminate the motivation for a race to judgment on the
issues of liability and therefore allow an insurer a more orderly de-
fense.' Implicit in the decision, however, is the idea that since
proration allows an equitable division of funds that is otherwise
unavailable, it is hoped that public-spirited insurers will often use
it.2 6
Nevertheless, the second holding in Tashire, limiting the use of
the Act to proration alone, may discourage insurers from using the
Act. Probably the real motive behind the increased use of the
Act by insurers has been a desire to sweep into a single court all
litigation arising out of an accident, including the issues of lia-
bility.' That this use of interpleader as a bill of peace could also
be advantageous for claimants is illustrated by the recent case of
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams"8 in which an insurer inter-
pleaded seventy persons of diverse citizenship who were injured in a
gas explosion. In granting an injunction against all trials on lia-
bility in any state or other federal court, the district court said it
was "essential that the claims be determined by the same trial of
facts . . . in order to minimize the disparity that would otherwise
result" in the later proration of claims.29
Under the facts in Tashire, however, it was obviously unfair to
the claimants to force them into a district court in another state for
trials on liability, and one may suspect that this was a tactical move
largely designed to pressure claimants into unfavorable settle-
ments." The opinion also points out that the claimants in Tashire
had joined several defendants and it would be especially anomalous
to allow a party with a relatively minor stake in a case to choose
the forum for all litigants.31 Federal courts are, in addition, proper-
ly reluctant to deprive claimants of their choice of courts or to re-
.386 U.S. at 533.28Id.
21 See recent cases cited supra note 22.
28231 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
28Id. at 867.
30 386 U.S. at 534. This could be cured, however, by change of venue
under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (1964).
8" In Tashire the suits against the bus line and bus driver were more
important than those against the truck driver. Assuming that the truck
driver was insolvent, the most that claimant could hope to collect would be
20,000 dollars on the policy. Suits against the other defendants involved
large sums as they were financially responsible. See also Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. La. 1966) where
relief similar to that in Tashire was given for similar reasons.
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move litigation from state courts unless a statute clearly so re-
quires.3
The Supreme Court was undoubtedly correct in its construction
of the Act. Even though the use of interpleader to effect proration
among all claimants will result in delay before any successful claim-
ant can get execution against an insurer, and even though a claim-
ant will have to go into a second court to collect, the benefits of an
equitable distribution will inure to all claimants and outweigh the
procedural disadvantages. This is the only effective device at pres-
ent to achieve proration, and it might be desirable for Congress to
extend the provisions of the Act to allow an insurer to bring in the
underlying litigation in appropriate cases,3  since this would in turn
encourage insurers to interplead all claimants. But the better so-
lution might be other legislation, based on minimal diversity,s" to
allow a claimant to demand proration, leaving injured parties free
to bring their actions on liability in whatever courts they choose.
HENRY C. MCFADYEN, JR.
Constitutional Law-De Facto Segregation-The Courts
and Urban Education
In the controversial decision of Hobsen v. Hansen,' the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia found evidence
of discrimination in the policies, practices and administration of
the School Board and in the continued existence of de facto segre-
gation in the school system. The court concluded that the Negro
" E.g., National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 230 F.
Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Professor Chaffee argued that interpleader
should not extend to trials on liability. Chaffee, Federal Interpleader Since
the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 420 (1940).
" For example, when most of the claimants are from a single state and
the interpleading insurer is the principal fund holder as in Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, supra note 28.
" In the words of the Supreme Court, "Art. III poses no obstacle to the
legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long
as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens." 386 U.S. at 531.
'269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967)
'Judge J. Skelly Wright, a member of the United States Court of Appeal
for the District of Columbia, was sitting as District Judge in this suit pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 291 (c) (1964).
'De facto segregation is a term used interchangeably with racial imbal-
ance denoting a fortuitous separation of races. A predominantly northern
and western phenomenon, it occurs when rigid neighborhood pupil assign-
ments are imposed on racially homogeneous neighborhood populations. See
1967]
